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.
This article examines several channels through  • 
which nominal debt contracts would affect the 
choice between inﬂ  ation targeting and price-level 
targeting.
While uncertainty about the long-run price level  • 
has been historically low in recent years, further 
reductions would be achieved through price-
level targeting. Reduced uncertainty would lead 
to lower risk premiums on longer debt contracts, 
resulting in higher levels of output and investment.
Given the existence of nominal assets and liabili- • 
ties, unexpected price-level shocks lead to a redis-
tribution of wealth that affects aggregate output 
through the asymmetric labour supply responses 
of young and old households. Since there is less 
redistribution under price-level 
targeting than under inﬂ  ation targeting, the redis-
tributive effects on output are smaller in the former 
regime. Welfare effects depend crucially, however, 
on how ﬁ  scal policy responds to the change in the 
government’s ﬁ  nancial position. 
W
hile a sizable number of central banks 
around the world, including the Bank of 
Canada, have successfully embraced 
inﬂ  ation targeting (IT), there is ongoing interest in 
assessing the merits of price-level targeting (PT) as 
an alternative policy framework (see, for example, 
Bank of Canada 2006). The differences between these 
regimes are not trivial. The main difference is that, 
under IT, unexpected disturbances to the price level 
are ignored, while under PT, they are reversed. This 
has important implications for price-level uncertainty: 
Under IT, uncertainty regarding the future price level 
increases without bound as the planning horizon 
grows, while under PT, the price level has a predeter-
mined targeted path and uncertainty about the future 
price level is bounded. 
Since most ﬁ  nancial contracts in the real world are not 
fully indexed to the price level, the difference in paths 
for the price level under IT and PT is an important 
consideration. The most important feature of nominal 
contracts is that changes in the price level lead to 
changes in the real value of contracts. Speciﬁ  cally, 
unexpected decreases in the price level increase 
the real value of nominal debt, while unexpected 
increases in the price level have the opposite effect. 
This is often referred to as the “debt-revaluation 
effect.” Thus, uncertainty about the price level 
imposes a risk premium that increases the cost of 
capital, which in turn negatively affects economic per-
formance. Because price-level uncertainty is higher 
under IT than under PT, the associated risk premium 
is also higher. This risk premium exists for all non-fully 
indexed ﬁ  nancial contracts, regardless of the source 
of the price-level shock. 
This article focuses on the characteristics of PT from 
a ﬁ  nancial perspective—that is, on the role of debt-
revaluation risk in assessing the merits of PT relative 
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BANK OF CANADA REVIEW   SPRING  2009to IT. The analysis is approached from several angles 
(e.g., risk premium, the difference in maturities of 
nominal debt contracts, and redistribution) but draws 
a general conclusion: Accounting for the revaluation 
of nominal debts and assets strengthens the relative 
merits of PT compared with IT. The article is based on 
an empirical analysis, as well as on structural models 
that are designed to capture selected stylized facts 
for the economy. In addition, although analyzing the 
source of the shock is another important element 
for evaluating the overall desirability of PT, the focus 
here is on the debt-revaluation effect of price-level 
shocks.1 The ﬁ  rst section assesses the extent of 
price-level uncertainty under the current IT regime in 
Canada. The second section quantiﬁ  es the beneﬁ  ts 
of PT over IT in a standard structural monetary model 
with emphasis on nominal debt contracts. In addition, 
it illustrates the mechanism through which PT reduces 
uncertainty and encourages economic agents to enter 
into long-term contracts. The third section examines 
the potential for wealth redistribution from price-level 
uncertainty under both IT and PT as nominal claims 
are revalued in real terms, as well as the implications 
of these redistributions for aggregate output and wel-
fare. The fourth section presents some explanations 
for why debt contracts are not indexed to the price 
level. The ﬁ  nal section contains our conclusions.
This article focuses on the role of debt-
revaluation risk in assessing the merits of 
PT relative to IT.
Price-Level Uncertainty in 
Canada
Many of the beneﬁ  ts of moving to PT would be 
achieved through its impact on reducing uncertainty 
about the future price level. Thus, to help quantify the 
potential effects from a change in policy framework, 
we begin by reviewing empirical evidence on the 
amount of price-level uncertainty that remains under 
Canada’s current IT framework. Particular attention is 
given to uncertainty over the relatively long horizons 
relevant for many ﬁ  nancial contracts.
1  Ambler (2009, this issue) and Côté (2007) provide comprehensive surveys of the recent 
literature on PT with emphasis on its stabilization properties. As these surveys suggest, 
the revaluation of nominal debt has received relatively less attention.
Before presenting the evidence, it is useful to highlight 
the relationship between long-run uncertainty about 
the price level and the conduct of monetary policy. 
Consider the case of an inﬂ  ation-targeting central 
bank that acts systematically to move inﬂ  ation back to 
its two per cent target. In this regime, the effects on 
the price level of deviations of current inﬂ  ation from 
the target are not reversed in later periods (“bygones 
are bygones”), so random shocks will cause the 
actual price level to deviate from the path implied 
by extrapolating from the inﬂ  ation target. The com-
mitment to move inﬂ  ation back to target means that 
long-run uncertainty about the price level will be lower 
than in an alternative regime lacking such an anchor.2 
Nevertheless, the presence of random shocks means 
that uncertainty will grow without bounds as the 
horizon increases, even if the current inﬂ  ation target 
is fully credible and is perceived to be permanent. 
If the public believes that the policy objective could 
change in the future—that the level of the target could 
be adjusted, for example—there would be an addi-
tional source of long-run uncertainty about the price 
level. For later discussion, this second channel will be 
referred to as “regime uncertainty.” 
An important conclusion from the above discussion is 
that the ideal measure of price-level uncertainty would 
incorporate the impact of both random shocks and 
potential future changes in the policy regime. Several 
approaches to measuring uncertainty are now pre-
sented. Since each has its own strengths and limita-
tions, evidence from all of these sources needs to be 
combined to form a comprehensive assessment of 
price-level uncertainty arising from the two channels. 
Survey evidence
The most direct way to measure price-level uncer-
tainty would be to survey the views of the general 
public or professional forecasters on the probability 
that the future price level will lie within various ranges. 
For Canada, this type of information is quite limited. 
Since 1999, Consensus Forecasts has asked profes-
sional forecasters to report their views on the prob-
ability of alternative outcomes for the inﬂ  ation rate 
during the current year, but not for longer periods. 
This source thus provides a measure of price-level 
uncertainty for the one-year horizon, but not for the 
longer horizons most relevant for many ﬁ  nancial 
decisions.3 
2  See Crawford (2001) for further discussion of how IT increases the predictability of aver-
age inﬂ  ation rates and the price level over long horizons.
3  There is no systematic trend in one-year uncertainty over the period 1999–2009.
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individual forecasters, researchers have used survey 
data on the dispersion of expected inﬂ  ation rates 
across different forecasters as an imperfect proxy for 
inﬂ  ation uncertainty. One reason for these two vari-
ables to move together is that greater clarity about the 
central bank’s policy objective would reduce regime 
uncertainty, leading to both less dispersion of inﬂ  ation 
expectations across different forecasters and less 
individual uncertainty. Since dispersion is probably 
correlated with uncertainty, it can be used to supple-
ment other sources of information on how uncertainty 
has changed over time.4 Moreover, since a survey 
provides explicitly forward-looking information, dis-
persion over long horizons may be particularly useful 
as an indicator of future regime uncertainty.
The Watson Wyatt survey of Canadian forecasters 
reports the dispersion of inﬂ  ation expectations for 
the consumer price index (CPI) over horizons up to 
15 years. These data can be used to calculate the 
implied dispersion of price-level expectations (deﬁ  ned 
as the percentage difference between the expected 
price level of forecasters at the 75th and 25th percent-
iles of the distribution). As shown in Chart 1, the dis-
persion of price-level expectations for 15 years ahead 
fell signiﬁ  cantly over the 1980s as inﬂ  ation became 
lower and less volatile. It fell further during the early 
years of the inﬂ  ation-targeting period, which began 
in 1991, and has stabilized at the lower level since the 
mid-1990s. This proﬁ  le suggests that IT contributed 
to a decline in long-run uncertainty about the price 
level by reducing uncertainty about the future policy 
objective.
Statistical estimates
An alternative to using survey data is to construct 
estimates from statistical models of inﬂ  ation. The 
regime-switching model is appropriate for this pur-
pose because it allows key features of the inﬂ  ation 
process—namely, the mean inﬂ  ation rate, inﬂ  ation 
persistence, and the variance of the error term—to 
change over time, as would be expected, given a 
signiﬁ  cant change in the monetary policy regime. 
Parameters from this model can be used to estimate 
price-level uncertainty over alternative horizons (see 
Box 1). This model should capture uncertainty related 
to random shocks. Since it is estimated using histor-
ical data, however, it will not fully reﬂ  ect uncertainty 
about the future policy regime. Accordingly, the 
forward-looking survey data on dispersion (Chart 1) 
4  U.S. evidence shows that dispersion of inﬂ  ation expectations does tend to be positively 
correlated with measures of individual uncertainty.
play a complementary role as indicators of how 
regime uncertainty changed after inﬂ  ation targets 
were implemented. 
*  Measured as a percentage of the price level at the forecast date. For 
example, the observation for 2008 represents the dispersion of price-
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Chart 1: Dispersion of Price-Level Expectations*
Consumer price index - 15 years ahead
The results show that uncertainty about the level 
of the CPI at the 15-year horizon peaked during the 
period of high and volatile inﬂ  ation in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, and then moderated signiﬁ  cantly by 
the mid-1980s (Chart 2). This measure fell slightly 
after the introduction of inﬂ  ation targets as inﬂ  ation 
persistence was eliminated.5 With the exception of the 
early part of the sample period, uncertainty is lower 
for core CPI, which excludes eight of the most volatile 
components.
Long-run uncertainty has been historic-
ally low . . . . Further decreases could be 
achieved under a PT framework.
The combined evidence from survey and statistical 
sources suggests that long-run uncertainty has been 
historically low during the inﬂ  ation-targeting period. 
Further decreases could be achieved under a PT 
framework in which random shocks to the price level 
are reversed. The credibility of the PT regime would 
inﬂ  uence the extent to which uncertainty would 
5  There is only a small decline over this period as the effect of lower persistence was largely 
offset by an increase in the standard deviation of the random error   . Uncertainty fell by 
a greater amount for core CPI as both persistence and   fell for that price index.
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The inﬂ  ation model   was 
estimated using annual CPI data from 1953 to 
2007, where   is the current inﬂ  ation rate and   
is the random error term.1 The regime-switching 
approach allows all the parameters of the inﬂ  ation 
process, including inﬂ  ation persistence   and 
the standard deviation   of the random error, 
to vary across different regimes. The number of 
regimes is determined by the data—ﬁ  ve regimes 
were identiﬁ  ed over the chosen sample period. 
The model also provides estimates of the prob-
abilities that a given regime describes the inﬂ  ation 
process in the current period. For comparison, 
another model was estimated for the core CPI, 
which excludes eight of the most volatile CPI 
components and the effect of changes in indirect 
taxes on the remaining components. 
Key parameter estimates from the CPI model are 
shown in Table A. When initial results found no 
evidence of inﬂ  ation persistence in a regime, this 
parameter was eliminated from the ﬁ  nal model. 
Regime 5 covers most of the inﬂ  ation-targeting 
period.
*  Years when the model assigns the highest probability to the regime. 
Table A:  Parameter Estimates for the CPI Model
R e g i m e 12345
0.29   — 0.64 0.29 —
  0.71 0.62 2.19 0.41 0.51











1  The data used for estimation exclude the effect of changes in indirect taxes, 
starting in 1984.
Calculating uncertainty
Price-level uncertainty in regime i (i = 1, ..., 5) is 
estimated using parameters from that regime 
(Table A) and the following formula: 
(1)
where   is the horizon (years).
Uncertainty at period   is a weighted average of 
uncertainty in each regime, where the weights are 
the estimated probabilities that the economy is in 
each regime in period   (PRit):
(2)
This measure is interpreted as the standard 
deviation of the future price level (measured as a 
percentage).
Equation 1 illustrates that the model’s estimates 
of uncertainty will include the impact of random 
shocks through the parameter  . Although the 
model produces estimated probabilities that each 
of the ﬁ  ve historical regimes is in effect during the 
current period, it does not capture uncertainty 
about a future move to a policy regime that has 
never been observed during the sample period. 
Thus, it will not fully reﬂ  ect uncertainty about the 
future policy regime. 
In a regime in which there is no inﬂ  ation persis-
tence (such as the inﬂ  ation-targeting period—
regime 5), equation 1 simpliﬁ  es to   . In this 
case, price-level uncertainty at a given horizon 
is lower than if persistence had been positive. 
Nevertheless, uncertainty under IT still increases 
as the horizon lengthens (i.e., it is “unbounded” as 
 increases). In contrast, uncertainty is bounded 
under PT because random shocks to the price 
level are reversed. generally higher in the presence of long-term nominal 
debt contracts, the fact that agents are forward 
looking and that the revaluation effects of nominal 
debts are present means that PT could still provide 
beneﬁ  ts in the presence of short-term nominal debts. 
This is explained in detail below. Dib, Mendicino, 
and Zhang’s dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium 
(DSGE) model is a small open economy and includes 
ﬁ  nancial market imperfections in both domestic and 
international markets. The authors take into account 
several sources of ﬂ  uctuation in the business cycle, 
including ﬁ  nancial shocks, and estimate the model 
with Canadian data. Based on social welfare evalua-
tions, they ﬁ  nd that PT delivers a welfare gain relative 
to Canada’s current IT regime. Speciﬁ  cally, welfare 
measured as average annual consumption under PT 
is 0.36 per cent higher than it is under IT. This number 
corresponds to $83 per capita per year or, alterna-
tively, to a one-time present-value gain of $2,075 per 
capita.
In the Dib, Mendicino, and Zhang study, PT outper-
forms IT because the trade-off between the model’s 
two main sources of distortion—nominal debt con-
tracts and stickiness in price and wage adjustments—
is less pronounced. Speciﬁ  cally, the trade-off is as 
follows: On the one hand, because debt contracts are 
speciﬁ  ed in nominal terms, unanticipated changes in 
the price level will generate changes in the real cost of 
debt. This generates risks to entrepreneurs, who are 
the borrowers in the model, and leads to inefﬁ  cient 
allocation of resources. To minimize the volatility 
in real repayments on nominal debts, the nominal 
interest rate should be set to stabilize the real interest 
rate (i.e., the real cost of debt). On the other hand, 
nominal rigidities in wages and prices generate inefﬁ  -
cient wage and price dispersions. To minimize the 
dispersions, an optimal monetary policy should set 
the nominal interest rate to stabilize inﬂ  ation, which 
would lead to higher volatility in the real interest rate. 
Under PT, this trade-off is less pronounced because, 
unlike with IT, forward-looking agents understand 
that a credible central bank will offset disturbances 
to the price level, and they will therefore take this 
into account when setting current prices. It is thus 
optimal for agents to change prices by less under 
PT than under IT. This is the so-called “expectations 
channel.”  6  Smaller price changes lead to lower inﬂ  a-
tion volatility as well as to lower price dispersions. 
6  An implication of this is that the trade-off between the reduction in long-run price-level 
uncertainty and the increase in the short-run inﬂ  ation volatility in PT relative to IT may not 
be severe in the model with forward-looking agents. See Ambler (2009, this issue) for a 
full discussion of the expectations channel under PT. Svensson (1999) pioneered the work 
highlighting this channel.
decrease and, therefore, the size of the welfare gains 
described in the remainder of this article.
*  Standard deviation as a percentage



















Price-Level Uncertainty, Risk 
Premiums, and Economic 
Performance
A key beneﬁ  t of PT relative to IT is the reduction in 
uncertainty about the price level, which will reduce 
debt-revaluation risks and facilitate long-term ﬁ  nancial 
planning. Howitt (2001) argues that such a reduction 
in uncertainty is most likely to generate substan-
tial welfare gains through its impact on long-term 
contracting. Fischer (1994), among others, argues, 
however, that the beneﬁ  ts for long-term contracting 
of reducing uncertainty about the price level are likely 
to be small, since the degree of uncertainty may be 
small. Yet the mechanism through which price-level 
uncertainty affects long-term contracting is not well 
understood, so we ﬁ  rst review a quantitative analysis 
of the relative beneﬁ  ts of PT with one-period nom-
inal debt contracts. This is followed by a qualitative 
analysis of the channel through which uncertainty 
about the price level affects the choice between 
short- and long-term nominal debt contracts.
Quantitative analysis in a medium-scale 
structural model
Dib, Mendicino, and Zhang (2008) provide a quantita-
tive assessment of the beneﬁ  ts of adopting a regime 
of price-level targeting in a medium-scale New 
Keynesian model augmented with one-period nom-
inal debt contracts. Although the beneﬁ  ts of PT are 
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higher than expected. The risk premium (or spread) 
associated with price-level risk is higher for long-term 
debt than for short-term debt, since it is more difﬁ  cult 
to forecast the price level in the distant future. Recent 
history can help to forecast the price level for the 
next quarter, but uncertainty increases as the horizon 
lengthens.
On the other hand, ﬁ  rm-level productivity risks make 
long-term debt more attractive for ﬁ  rms. With short-
term debt, interest payments ﬂ  uctuate from period 
to period. With long-term debt, however, they are 
constant over the life of the debt contract. Hence, 
long-term debt contracts provide partial insurance to 
the borrower against ﬂ  uctuations in interest payments 
resulting from changes in the level of default risks 
related to ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ  c productivity shocks.
Reducing long-run price-level uncer-
tainty through PT decreases the risk 
premium and reduces the cost of capital.
The ﬁ  rst ﬁ  nding of the Meh-Quadrini-Terajima study 
is that reducing long-run price-level uncertainty from 
the current level (as reported in the ﬁ  rst section of the 
paper) through PT decreases the risk premium and 
thus reduces the cost of capital. Second, lowering 
uncertainty about the price level can lead to an 
increase in the fraction of agents using long-term 
nominal debt and a rise in aggregate investment and 
output. These results are consistent with the work 
of D’Amico, Kim, and Wei (2008) and Hördahl (2008), 
who argue that the gain from reducing long-run 
uncertainty about the price level through a lower risk 
premium could be substantial (they both estimate the 
premium to be, on average, 50 basis points at the 
10-year horizon for a U.S. sample period from 1990 
onwards).
Redistributional and Aggregate 
Effects of Price-Level Shocks 
The previous section discusses the risk premium 
channel, through which lower price-level uncertainty 
under price-level targeting would affect economic 
activities, owing in part to the ex ante expectations 
channel. In this section, we focus on the redistri-
butional effects of realized price-level shocks. An 
unanticipated rise in the price level redistributes 
With this channel in operation, PT provides more room 
to optimally set the nominal interest rate to lower the 
distortion associated with nominal debts. This leads 
to lower volatility in the real interest rate. Hence, even 
though the Dib, Mendicino, and Zhang model features 
one-period nominal contracts, which limit the poten-
tial gains from PT, the expectations channel under PT 
leads to smaller revaluation risks of these contracts. 
It is worth mentioning that the gain from PT over IT 
would be even larger if nominal debt contracts are 
set at greater maturity than the one-period contracts 
in their model. This suggests that the prevalence of 
nominal debts in the real world should make PT even 
more desirable than suggested by their model. We 
now illustrate this point.
Price-level uncertainty and long-term 
contracts: A channel
While Dib, Mendicino, and Zhang do not incorporate 
long-term contracts in their analyses, Meh, Quadrini, 
and Terajima (2008a) provide a qualitative analysis 
of the channel through which uncertainty about the 
price level affects the endogenous choice between 
short- and long-term nominal debt contracts. Using a 
small-scale model, they seek to answer the following 
interrelated questions: Would PT encourage more 
long-term contracts and, if so, by what channel? 
Furthermore, what are the implications for aggregate 
output? To answer these questions, they use a small 
open economy model featuring two types of persis-
tent shock: a ﬁ  rm-speciﬁ  c productivity shock and an 
aggregate price-level shock. Information is perfect, so 
that all agents know the realization of shocks as well 
as their exogenous processes. Both types of shock 
are found to play an important role in the choice of the 
maturity of nominal debts. In the model, ﬁ  rms ﬁ  nance 
investment by choosing either short- or long-term 
nominal debts. Long-term debt is an N-period con-
tract in which interest payments are constant during 
the life of the contract. Short-term debt is a one-
period contract. An interesting and important feature 
of the model is that, since ﬁ  rms can choose to default 
on either type of debt, ﬁ  nancial intermediaries charge 
a risk premium to compensate for default risks. These 
intermediaries are assumed to be risk neutral and to 
operate competitively.
The interaction between the two types of shock and 
default risks makes the choice between short- or 
long-term nominal debt non-trivial for borrowers. On 
the one hand, price-level risk makes long-term debt 
less attractive for ﬁ  rms (i.e., the borrowers) because of 
the potential for revaluation of nominal debts. The real 
value of debt increases when the price level is lower 
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it was on the pre-shock path. Under PT, the central 
bank is assumed to credibly bring the price level back 
to its original path within a given time horizon. Under 
IT, the household sector loses wealth equivalent to 
0.4 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) (or 
$5.5 billion), which is 2.7 times larger than that under 
PT (with a 6-year target horizon7 ).8 In addition, on 
average under both regimes, the young low-income, 
the young middle-income, and the government—who 
are all debtors—are the winners, while middle-aged 
workers, the old, and the high-income are the losers. 
Redistribution of real wealth is large and 
consistently greater under IT than it is 
under PT.
Aggregate output and welfare effects 
Regarding the second question, Meh, Ríos-Rull, and 
Terajima (2008) use an overlapping-generations model 
in which agents differ in labour-productivity proﬁ  les 
as well as in their propensities to work and save.9 
Redistributions derived from the ﬁ  rst question are 
assigned to respective agents in the economy, and 
we observe the changes in their behaviours. A key 
insight from this work is that analyses of the effect of 
redistributions on aggregate output and welfare need 
to consider the role that ﬁ  scal policy plays following 
the government’s windfall gains or losses. With a 
positive price-level shock, for example, the govern-
ment’s nominal debt decreases in real value, which 
is an improvement in the government’s portfolio. The 
authors do not take a stand on how the government 
optimally uses its windfall gain. Instead, they illustrate 
the importance of ﬁ  scal policy for the economic 
effects of redistributions by considering several ﬁ  scal 
policy scenarios that balance the government budget 
after the initial change in the real value of government 
debt. The government can transfer the windfall gain 
through a reduction in the labour tax or as a transfer 
to retirees.
7  The redistribution of wealth from price-level movements as well as the aggregate output 
and welfare effects of this redistribution increase with the horizon under PT. See Box 2 for 
more details.
8  We take a one-time positive one per cent shock as a benchmark. Redistributions regard-
ing other magnitudes and both positive and negative shocks can be found in Meh, Ríos-
Rull, and Terajima (2008). IT is generally found to lead to larger redistributions than PT.
9  The model assumes that the central bank credibly commits to its policy. Potential issues 
with the credibility of the central bank commitment are discussed in Ambler (2009, this 
issue).
wealth from lenders to borrowers, since such an 
increase lowers the real value of nominal assets and 
liabilities. The size of this redistribution of wealth is 
different for IT and PT and depends on the maturity 
structure of nominal assets and liabilities. Under 
PT, the real value of long-term nominal claims is 
less sensitive to movements in the price level, since 
the price level is restored within some horizon after 
experiencing a shock. Under IT, the real values of 
long- and short-term nominal claims are equally 
affected by movements in the price level. As a result, 
the redistribution of wealth from changes in the price 
level is higher under IT than it is under PT. Moreover, 
given that a large part of households’ portfolios 
consists of longer-term assets and liabilities (70 per 
cent with the term-to-maturity over one year; see Meh 
and Terajima 2009, this issue), the difference in the 
size of the redistributions between the two regimes is 
expected to be large. 
Using Canadian data, Meh, Ríos-Rull, and Terajima 
(2008) consider the effects that arise under IT and 
PT as nominal holdings are revalued following an 
unexpected surge in the price level. Speciﬁ  cally, they 
address two questions. First, through the detailed 
documentation of nominal portfolios belonging to dif-
ferent agents in the economy (see Meh and Terajima 
2009, this issue), they assess the potential wealth 
redistributions of unexpected shocks to the price 
level under both IT and PT regimes. Second, they 
quantify the implications of these redistributions for 
aggregate output and the welfare implications under 
both regimes.
Redistribution of wealth 
With respect to the ﬁ  rst question, the authors ﬁ  nd 
that the size of the redistribution of real wealth is large 
and consistently greater under IT than it is under PT. 
Redistributions occur because the level and com-
position of nominal assets and liabilities varies across 
agents. In addition, differences between the two 
monetary policy regimes emerge because of the inter-
action between the term to maturity of these claims 
and the post-shock path for the price level under each 
monetary policy regime. Speciﬁ  cally, under PT, long-
term assets and liabilities are more protected from a 
price-level shock, since the price level would likely be 
brought back to the pre-shock path by their maturity 
dates. Given that long-term assets and liabilities are 
prevalent in the economy, redistributions are expected 
to be smaller under PT. Based on the portfolios of 
nominal assets and liabilities in 2005, we analyze a 
one-time, positive, one per cent price-level shock. 
Under IT, the price level after the shock stays on a 
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the increase in aggregate output is larger under IT 
than under PT when the government makes transfers 
to the old.
Welfare effects
The welfare effects of price-level shocks are also 
larger under IT than under PT. The direction of the 
change in the weighted welfare of heterogeneous 
households depends crucially, however, on the ﬁ  scal 
policy scenario used to deal with the government’s 
wealth gains (losses) that arise from changes in the 
real value of its debt. Speciﬁ  cally, whether aggregate 
welfare increases or decreases depends on the ﬁ  scal 
policy scenario and the different responses of hetero-
geneous households to both the redistributions and 
the ﬁ  scal policy. Given the heterogeneous types (e.g., 
age and income) of households, one way to measure 
aggregate welfare is to take a weighted average of 
changes in welfare for each type. The size and the 
direction of redistributions differ for each type and 
hence the effects on welfare differ as well. In addition, 
the change in welfare does not sum to zero because 
(as explained above) households respond differently 
to redistributions for aggregate output and because 
the ﬁ  scal policy of reallocating the government 
gains may be directed to one group over another. 
If the ﬁ  scal policy scenario favours retirees (i.e., an 
10  Everything else being equal, cutting the income tax rate for labour increases the labour 
supply of all workers (e.g., young and middle-aged).
The key results regarding aggregate output are that 
the effects of an unexpected change in the price 
level are larger under IT than under PT (regardless of 
the ﬁ  scal policy scenario). They show that although 
the redistributions are zero sum across agents in 
the economy, the aggregate effects on output are 
non-zero under both regimes. The intuition behind 
this ﬁ  nding is as follows. In the model, a positive 
price-level shock, for example, generates redistribu-
tions from high-income, old, and middle-aged savers 
to young, low-income borrowers. This wealth effect 
causes young households to reduce their labour 
supply and middle-aged households to increase their 
labour supply, with no change by the old (who are 
retired). Independent of ﬁ  scal policies, the increase 
in the labour supply by middle-aged households 
outweighs the decrease by young households, since 
the wealth losses of the middle-aged are larger than 
the wealth gains of the young (see Meh and Terajima 
2009, this issue). As a result, there are aggregate 
effects from the redistribution of wealth, even though 
the redistribution shock is zero sum across agents 
in the economy, including the government. Because 
the initial redistribution is larger under IT, the effect on 
labour supply is also ampliﬁ  ed, and the overall effect 
on output is larger under IT than under PT. When, for 
example, the government cuts the labour tax rate to 
reallocate its windfall gains to households, a one-time, 
one per cent price-level shock leads to an increase in 
aggregate output of 0.1 per cent of GDP (or $1.4 bil-
lion) under IT, while under PT (with a 6-year horizon), 
38  
PRICE-LEVEL UNCERTAINTY, PRICE-LEVEL TARGETING, AND NOMINAL DEBT CONTRACTS 
BANK OF CANADA REVIEW   SPRING  2009
Box 2
Importance of a Horizon for the Target Price Level 
The horizon used for price-level targeting (PT) 
is the time it takes the monetary authority to 
restore the price level to its initial path following 
unexpected disturbances. This horizon plays an 
essential role in determining the economic effects 
of the redistribution of wealth. Speciﬁ  cally, Meh, 
Ríos-Rull, and Terajima (2008) show that, as the 
horizon under PT becomes longer, the magnitude 
of the redistribution becomes larger and eventu-
ally converges to that observed under inﬂ  ation 
targeting (IT). The same result holds for the initial 
reaction of output to the redistributions. This is 
clearly illustrated in Table A, which shows the 
initial responses in output to a one-time positive 
one per cent price-level shock for IT, PT with a 
15-year horizon, and PT with a 6-year horizon. The 
numbers are shown in percentage deviations from 
the initial steady state. The initial response for IT is 
more than twice that of PT with a 15-year horizon 
and more than three times that of PT with 6-year 
horizon. 
Table A: Horizons for Price-Level Targeting and Initial 
Output Responses from Redistributions
IT PT: 15-year horizon PT: 6-year horizon
0.104 0.049 0.031In a recent paper, Meh, Quadrini, and Terajima (2008b) 
provide further insight into the reasons why ﬁ  nancial 
contracts are not fully indexed. They study an equilib-
rium model featuring repeated moral hazard arising 
from asymmetric information between ﬁ  rms and 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. There are several important 
ﬁ  ndings from their work. First, despite the avail-
ability of fully indexed ﬁ  nancial contracts, the optimal 
ﬁ  nancial contract is imperfectly indexed to the price 
level because (i) the nominal price level (e.g., the GDP 
deﬂ  ator) is observed with delay, and (ii) there is uncer-
tainty with respect to the measurement of prices. This 
result is consistent with that of Jovanovic and Ueda 
(1997). Although the delay is considerably shorter in 
the case of the CPI, it is longer for the GDP deﬂ  ator, 
for which revisions occur for extended periods (see 
Bullard 1994).  
The second ﬁ  nding is that the overall degree of nom-
inal indexation increases with price-level uncertainty 
(arising from nominal shocks). To put it differently, 
economies with higher uncertainty about the price 
level experience a higher degree of indexation, while 
economies with lower uncertainty feature a lower 
degree of indexation. The last ﬁ  nding is that, in the 
presence of endogenous indexation, a monetary 
policy regime that reduces uncertainty about the price 
level will lead to better macroeconomic stabilization 
(e.g., output and investment stabilization).12 
Conclusion
The ﬁ  ndings highlighted in this article suggest that 
accounting for the revaluation of nominal debts and 
assets is important when comparing IT and PT. 
Speciﬁ  cally, the work reviewed suggests that the 
revaluation of nominal debts and assets makes PT a 
much more desirable monetary policy regime than 
IT (with respect to nominal shocks). By reducing 
uncertainty about the price level, PT reduces the risk 
premium associated with price-level risks on nominal 
debts and, as a result, encourages more long-term 
planning and increases both aggregate output and 
welfare. In addition, the work summarized in this 
article demonstrates that the extent of long-run uncer-
tainty about the price level (which is at the source of 
the revaluation effects) is low by historical standards 
but still remains unbounded under the current IT 
12  Interestingly, with a different class of model economy, Amano, Ambler, and Ireland (2007) 
ﬁ  nd similar results, but for the case of endogenous wage indexation. Speciﬁ  cally, they 
show that the optimal degree of wage indexation is lower under PT (i.e., lower price-level 
uncertainty) than under IT (i.e., relatively higher long-run uncertainty about the price level) 
and this leads to an improvement in welfare. Although PT reduces price-level uncertainty, 
there is still some remaining uncertainty and because of this, agents still optimally choose 
to index their wage (but to a lesser degree).
increase in transfers to the old, who were the losers 
from inﬂ  ation), following a one per cent price-level 
shock, welfare increases by 0.20 per cent and 0.09 
per cent under IT and PT, respectively. Because the 
transfers to retirees are distributed equally to each old 
household regardless of their income class, some of 
them, e.g., low- and middle-income households, are 
overcompensated by the transfer, which leads to an 
improvement in overall welfare. On the other hand, if 
the ﬁ  scal-policy scenario favours workers (i.e., a tax 
cut on labour income), following a one per cent price-
level shock, weighted average welfare falls by 0.06 per 
cent of consumption under IT and by 0.03 per cent 
under PT. In this case, weighted welfare falls despite 
the increase in aggregate output, since tax cuts for 
younger and middle-aged households bolster the 
supply of labour, but losses among older households 
go uncompensated by the ﬁ  scal policy.11 Welfare 
decreases despite the increase in output because of 
the heterogeneous responses of households to the 
negative redistribution of wealth and the fact that the 
losers from inﬂ  ation, particularly the retirees, are not 
compensated by the tax cut on labour income.
Endogenous Indexation of Debt 
Contracts
While the foregoing sections highlight the challenges 
that uncertainty about the price level presents for 
ﬁ  nancial contracting, we should recognize that agents 
can address these challenges by indexing their con-
tracts to the price level. In reality, however, we observe 
that most ﬁ  nancial contracts are not fully indexed. 
This raises an interesting question: If price-level 
uncertainty is indeed a source of risk, why do agents 
choose to bear these risks rather than fully index their 
contracts to the price level? Answering this ques-
tion is essential in the IT-PT debate, since indexing 
behaviour may vary between the two regimes. Several 
answers have been suggested in the literature; per-
haps, for example, the price level cannot be observed 
in sufﬁ  cient time (Lucas 1972) or it is costly to incor-
porate the price level into contracts. Another answer 
commonly suggested is that different agents may 
consume different baskets of goods and thus prefer 
to contract on different prices. Because of this hetero-
geneity, it may not be optimal to index contracts to a 
single price index.
11  As Tobin (1965) argues, it is important not to confuse output with welfare. The objective of 
a benevolent government is to increase the welfare (utility) of its citizens, and not just the 
output.
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credible, there would be additional costs during the 
transition from IT to PT as well as after the transition 
in sustaining the PT regime, which would reduce 
the desirability of moving to PT. Recent research at 
the Bank of Canada has started making important 
progress in this direction (see, for example, Kryvtsov, 
Shukayev, and Ueberfeldt 2008). Another caveat 
concerns the assumption of the existence of only 
one-period nominal debts when quantifying the bene-
ﬁ  ts of PT in a medium-scale macroeconomic model. 
Accounting for long-term nominal debts should 
increase the beneﬁ  ts of price-level targeting.
regime. Given that a large part of portfolios consists 
of nominal long-term assets and liabilities, the redistri-
bution of wealth resulting from unanticipated changes 
in the price level is larger under IT than under PT. 
The aggregate consequences are also larger under 
IT than under PT; the welfare consequences of these 
redistributions depend, however, on the response of 
ﬁ  scal policy.
Because of technical difﬁ  culties, the studies sum-
marized in this article have made several simplifying 
assumptions. A notable assumption when examining 
the economic effects of PT in the presence of nom-
inal debts is that PT is implemented with perfect 
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